Much continues to divide the American administration and the Pakistan Army when it comes to war against militancy in the region.

But a relentless focus on the negatives can often miss signs of convergences when and where they occur. In the last week, Gen Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, has given interviews to PBS and CNN in which he has taken a measured and thoughtful line on Pakistan: the general appreciated the turnaround in Swat/Malakand division, acknowledged the sacrifices of military men and civilians, outlined some actions the security forces have already taken in North Waziristan, accepted the wrongs committed by the US in the region in the past and showed some sympathy for the army’s desire of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan.

And yet Gen Petraeus did not end up sounding like he was simply pandering to a remote Pakistani audience. When asked by Charlie Rose of PBS, “So the bottom line is you are satisfied with the Pakistani effort and the Pakistani cooperation and the Pakistani effort to wipe out the Taliban in Pakistan?” the general demurred. “Well, I wouldn’t allow you to put words in my mouth. What I would say is that Pakistan has made significant progress in its fight against extremists threatening its existence.”

Pakistan and the US could do with more such frankness in the months ahead. Part of the problem between the US and Pakistan is undeniably a difference of strategic interests — another fact that Gen Petraeus acknowledged in his PBS interview. But part of the problem seems to be that for many years the US and Pakistan were unwilling to be honest with one another.

For a long time, the American side relentlessly bashed Pakistan for its support for the Afghan Taliban and tolerance of militancy generally. Yet the fact of the matter is that had the US been in Pakistan’s shoes it might have made the same choices: regard the military threat posed by India as pre-eminent and be wary of over-stretch and blowback inside the country. This is not to imply that the Pakistan Army has done absolutely everything it could and should have in the war against militancy — the army is at the very least guilty of responding tardily to the internal threat — but to point out that American policy was not grounded in the realism needed. On its part, the Pakistan Army has held its cards unnecessarily close. It should have spelled out what it could or could not do in various circumstances and presented the outside world with clearer alternatives. Guessing games and feints have helped neither the Americans nor the Pakistanis.