The war against militants inside Pakistan received a boost yesterday. Damadola in Bajaur Agency, for too long a stamping ground of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, has seen the Pakistan flag raised for the first time since 1947, according to Maj Gen Tariq Khan, the Frontier Corps commander.
The next areas to be cleared are the Tirah valley in Khyber Agency and Orakzai Agency, according to Maj Gen Khan. Meanwhile, it appears that another senior militant, Qari Zafar, senior leader of the Fidayeen-i-Islam, a group that straddles the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and sectarian outfits such as the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaish-i-Mohammad, is dead. Zafar is believed to have been killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan Agency last February — originally based in South Waziristan, he and his cohorts probably fled following the army operation which began there last October.
Considering the evidence since late 2008, it appears that the country may be finally turning the corner in the war against militancy. Military operations have by and large been successful in clearing and, at least initially, holding the areas in which they have been attempted. Enhanced cooperation with the Americans has led to many successes against top commanders in Fata via drone strikes (though there is still too little known about how many civilians have died in such strikes, while Pakistan’s official denial of such cooperation continues to cloud the programme). In the cities, more vigorous counter-terrorism measures and enhanced intelligence have led to the capture of many militants and appear to have reduced the frequency and deadliness of suicide and fidayeen strikes against urban targets.
And yet, there are reasons to be doubtful. Nowhere has there really been the kind of head-on fight between the militants and the state that some predicted. From Swat to South Waziristan to Damadola, there has been fighting but the captures and kills have not added up to the earlier estimates of the militants’ strength. What this implies is that while communication networks and bases of the militants have been dismantled, the militants have often simply melted away — perhaps to return to fight another day. To address this problem at least two things need to be done urgently. One, the existing cooperation on the Pak-Afghan border needs to be ramped up between the Pakistan and Afghan/US sides: militants on both sides have a habit of taking sanctuary in the other’s territory when under pressure. Two, the state here must realise that every stage of counter-insurgency is vital: after clear-and-hold, the build-and-transfer stages are crucial to preventing the militants from returning. At the moment, though, there is no sign of the ‘civilian surge’.







