EVEN though expectations of last month’s Delhi meeting between India and Pakistan’s foreign secretaries were minimal, there was nevertheless hope that it would ease at least some of the tension between the two countries.

Instead, the foreign secretaries stuck close to their briefs, refusing to take the lead in demonstrating initiative or imagination. This is hardly surprising, given the media glare and the eagerness with which motives were surmised from innocuous observations.

Nevertheless, the positive value of this meeting should not be dismissed. For one, it was the first formal meeting between the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries in over a year, and that too after India had pushed the pause button on the composite dialogue process while canvassing major powers to make Pakistan comply with its demands on terrorism.

India appears to have realised that other than expressions of sympathy, nothing substantive was gained from this unimaginative policy. The country failed to appreciate that Pakistan’s cooperation on the ‘war on terror’ occupied a higher priority for these countries; consequently, over time, Pakistan was able to convince western powers of its inability to devote resources to the western front unless its concerns on the eastern front were allayed.

Meanwhile, there has been a welcome national consensus in Pakistan on some critical issues, especially on domestic militancy and relations with India. The government’s initial naiveté, as evidenced in the Pakistani president’s statements on relations with India and on our nuclear doctrine, has given way to greater maturity and pragmatism. While the government claims credit for this, its critics see in it the army’s assertive role in the articulation of the country’s strategic goals, and the opposition’s support to the government on these issues.

In truth, it is likely to be a combination of these factors; nevertheless resultantly, the Americans now appear more appreciative of our efforts against the militants and more cognisant of our concerns and interests — which has raised Pakistan’s level of confidence in its dialogue with India.

In any case, with the ice having been broken and with both foreign secretaries having demonstrated their ‘nationalist’ credentials, they can hopefully go back to resuming meaningful negotiations. It is Pakistan’s strong belief that the only agreed upon mechanism, to which both countries have been wedded, is the composite dialogue process. India, however, fears that this structured ‘format’ makes an exchange on Kashmir unavoidable and is therefore seeking to sidestep it.

This is neither feasible nor advisable. The disputed nature of Kashmir is a matter of record for not only the United Nations but in terms of numerous bilateral understandings and agreements. Pakistan may over the years have extended more than diplomatic and political support to the Kashmiris, but India is aware that no amount of external assistance can keep a liberation movement alive in the face of brutality unless it enjoys considerable domestic support.

India must also recognise that even a complete end to Pakistan’s support to the Kashmiri cause will have, at best, only marginal impact on the freedom movement, which will continue to inflict enormous costs on India. More importantly, as long as it keeps millions of Kashmiris suppressed, India will never achieve the recognition it merits.

Pakistan, too, must review its Kashmir policy. We have engaged in disastrous adventures to convince India to abandon its claim. None of them have advanced the Kashmir cause, or even marginally improved the lives of its people. In fact, this policy has had a deeply debilitating impact on our national economy while seriously distorting our psyche.

If all this is true, is it not incumbent upon both sides to recognise the urgency of a solution? Neither India’s continued occupation of Kashmir, nor Pakistan’s overwhelming preoccupation with ousting it, has earned either country any kudos. In fact, most foreign powers are tired of being asked to take sides in a wrangle the world has lost interest in, except when the temperature rises enough to raise the spectre of a nuclear confrontation.

The latest evidence of this ennui was the silence maintained on the issue during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Riyadh. Not only did Kashmir fail to find any reference, but Singh found the occasion much too opportune to not berate Pakistan with unusual vehemence.

Many Pakistanis were disappointed by references to their ‘strategic ties’ but this was inevitable given the two countries’ growing cooperation, as evidenced by an annual trade of $25bn and oil sales to Delhi touching $3bn a year. If close friends such as the Saudis and the Chinese are averse to bringing up the Kashmir issue in their interaction with India, can we expect anything better from the others?

While abandonment of the Kashmir cause cannot be envisaged, we need to rethink our strategy. The use of violence by militants has been no less disastrous than the eagerness with which Musharraf was willing to give up established historic positions without seeking reciprocal concessions. However, it is time for India to recognise that for the first time, major political parties in Pakistan are committed to cooperative relations; meanwhile, in Manmohan Singh, Pakistan may have an interlocutor who appreciates that good relations with Pakistan are to his country’s advantage.

In such a situation, it is not enough to merely engage in crisis management; the two countries need to resume their journey by pledging that terrorist incidents will not be allowed to derail the dialogue process, nor deter them from their strategic objective of resolving differences. The two countries need to begin by ending support for separatists and militants in each other’s territory and then shift gears by focusing on relatively simpler issues.

Draft agreements on Siachen and Sir Creek are ready and await only formal approval. Thereafter, India can show good faith by accommodating Pakistan’s concerns on the water issue and Pakistan can think of relaxing the trade regime for India’s exports. If we can begin with these steps, we will already have brought about a qualitative change in our relations to the collective good of both countries.